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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARY A SCHOEN.

Plaint1tf/ Appellant.

vs

Case No. 19345

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,

Defendant/Respondent

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT IJF

This

is

NATU~E

OF THI' CA)E

;in act i0n before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pur-

11Jant to Section 35-4-llJ(il, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking
,11•1icial review ot a decision of the Roard of Review of the Industrial Com.,,,,1ion ot
I

Utah, which denied unemployment benefits to the Plaintiff, Mary

\rhoen, pursuant tn Section 35-4-4(c I, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amend-

"'''Pocket Supplement,
•,he

whir'o

~tf,,rt

"•ir•

t11

19.~l

),

on the grounds that during certain weeks for

claimed henefits she failed to demonstrate a "good faith" active
seek employment

'''tahlished an

as

required for eligibility.

overpayment liability

in the amount

tinn 35-4-6(d), Utah Code Annotated 1953.

- l -

This disqualificaof $498, pursuant

DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits by a Department
tive pursuant to Section

35-4-4(c),

Utah Code

Annotated

kP1ir<:1Pntd

di

19~3,

a111enu,~

(Pocket Supplement, 1981 ), effective January 2, 1983 and continuinq, l•n t:,e
grounds her

work

search

did

not

meet

minimum

standards

for

eliyihilit:'.

This decision established an overpayment liability in the amount of
the weeks ended January 8, 1983 through February 5, l91:l3.

~bb4

f:

Plaintiff a1,µeale1

to an Appeal Referee who modified the decision of the Department keµre,ento
tive to deny benefits from January 2, 1983 through January 28, l9cU, an<J reduced the overpayment liability to $498,
Case No. 83-A-1553.

by decision dated April

4,

l"dc,

Plaintiff appealed to the Board of Review ot the

lrHiu1-

trial Commission of Utah, which by decision issued June 29, 191:l3,
No. 83-A-1553,

83-BR-246,

affirmed

the

decision

of

the

Appeal

rn Cct1e
c\eferee

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Defendant's decision and asks the Court
to find that Plaintiff is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits frum
January 2, 1983 until she is no longer otherwise eligible.

Defendant see,1

affirmance of the decision of the Board of Review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as claimant, became unemµloyed at tn•
end of October, 1982 and reopened an existing claim for benefits.

- 2 -

k. 1 J1J~,

1

11w

1

1inrl1Jsion ot

her henefit yeor the clain1ant filed a new claim for

'>·»etr", effPctive llecemher :i,

19~2.

R.U082

The claimant certified on her

tor lre:nefits t.hat she receiver! a Cidimctnt r,uide explaining her rights

1,,,,,

;r1'1 rPspnns 1hi I it ies and that she understood that she must personally seek
111rk anrl lw ahle anrl available to accept full-time work.
nt
,10

ilso receive1J a form entitled "r<esponsihil1ties While

R.0082.

The Clairn-

Claimin~

Heneflts,"

which she was instr1Jcte<1 to make three new in-person contacts each week.
Near the end of January the claimant received an Eligibility Review

0.1111',]

'"'1tice nsking her to complete a form "nd rc:port to the local
,,ttice on

Fehruary

~'"~loyment

1·,1n.

3, 1983 at

9:01J a.m.

unemployment

to discuss her prospects

of

re-

and review her continuing eligibility for unemployment compensa-

R.lllllS

The form the claimant was aske11 to complete instructed her to

rnrnplHe the form accurately and advised her that her eligibility for unem~1'J'/t'1Pnt

insurance would be based in part on the information she provided and

thilt she '1as to bring the form with her when she reported for her interview.
!ne report

asked a

repnrt all

contacts she mane to seek work in the prior 30 days.

1

111

tnp

number

of questions and also required the claimant to
R.0079-0080

t_hat forrn the claimant reported that she made two employer contacts during
week enc1ed January 8, 1983, two employer contacts the week ended January

I 1, I Y~3. anrl t1>0 employer contacts the week ended January 22, 1983.
'"'' t11r111 also
1111pt1 lanuary
lairnant

shows that

zg

the

claimant

contacted three employers the week

and four empl ayers the week ended February 5, 1983.

verified

the

foregoing

K.OU8U

work-search

- 3 -

efforts

in

her

R.UU8U

testimony

before the Appeal Referee.
claimant were

R.0056

in person,

letter or resume.
On February

some

Some of the employer contacts mark tr,

were

by

telephone

and

tiy

some were

wr

itt

R.00560057, 0078,0080
14,

1983 the Department

Representative

issued

a

rJ,,, ,,, ,,

denying benefits to the claimant beginning January 2, 1~83 and continuinr;,
the grounds

the claimant's

eligibility.
$664 for
1983.

This

benefits

R.0077

tative on

work

decision

also

search

did

created

not

an

meet

minimum

overpayment

received during the period

January

in

standdrt1S
the

2 through

111

f,

amount,,,
Fenruu; c,

The claimant appealed the decision of the Department ~eµresen-

February

17,

1983.

R.0071

Notice

of

hearing was

issued to t11e

claimant on March 15, 1983, (R.0070) and a hearing was held before an Aµf!ea'
Referee on March 22, 1983.
the matter

on April

R.0042

4, 1983,

The Appeal Referee issued her tlecis1on

modifying the disqualification to

ic

include the

weeks ended January 8, 15 and 22, 1983 and allowing benefits beginnin~ J":i,,ary 23, 1983.

The decision

the overpayment to $498.

of the Appeal

Referee also modified

or

reduce'J

R.0038-0040

ARGUMENT
POINT
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS~IUN
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.

This Court has consistently held that where the findings
sion and the Board

of

Review are

supported

- 4 -

by

evidence,

of the r 1111r1111

they

wi 11

n,,1

'"

,,f
/r1

'·1p<nr,prs ,,f lrnn Wnr<Pr', linirin of Provo v.

/1)',

/11

l 1itcJf1

lt tf11-->re
tin<iinqs
(-n11 rt

l ..i4'i:, this

,

')1i 1Y-:,t;int1..-il

is
ilWI

1r1'1v

n1it.

Industrial Commission, 139

l1elrl:

r()11rt

rJ111r:ritent

rivir1ence to sustain the

1Jec1s1,,n ot tl1c lndusi.rial Commission, this
'-J't

as i r1P

thP 11ec.

i ', 1 on

f?vPn

though

on a

rPviPw nt thP rPrnr 11 WP rni<Jht ,.,Pll have reached a differ-

~,nt

rp<:,1J1 t.

11h 'l'pr1f1c rpferPnce t"' the 'juestion of availability, this Court has

It "
011r <Jut; to pq,n1nc· the record and to affirm the
r1Prisiun 1Jnless wP ran ·.a1 ,,., d •11atter of law that the
(nnrl1j';lOn

1rn the

q1n--'St

11Jr

'l+

"dv311ahle for work''

WdS

wrnn': heciluSP only the opµusite conclusion could be
'1rdwn froin the farts. i,ocke v. ~. 420 P. 2d 44,46
illtah, IYfifi); citing Salt Lake County v. Industrial Com1Cission, ];)11 P. 2d 321 llJtah, 1940).
PU;,~~

11

'lff 1111A~O 1lF REVIEW llF TrlE INDU:,TR;AL COMMISSlON DID NOT ERR
111 llETCPM:~INI; THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO MEET THE WORK SEARCH
Rf_1)ll!REMENT) FUR El lidll!LITY AND THUS WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR
1,.111p~ ANn THI~ DETERMINAT!tlN IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIl~ENCE.

n,..

claiP1ant

cnntPnris

"1flc,,1hlP milnnpr thP
"ire,,1Pnt "'·
11cf,. in

hoviPvPr,

that

the commission has applied in a rigid and

so-cal !Pd 2-3 new in-person
only

dn

interpretive

contact

rule.

guideline that

is

That reconsidered

most nrcupat1ons and areas, but is not applied rigidly or inflex-

'" al I cases, nor has it been adopted as a formal
,d 1 (Jn.

- 5 -

general rule of adju-

Section 35-4-4(c) requires, by direct statutory language, that

d

, :""-

ant for unemployment insurance make an active and good faith effort tr,',,,_,,,,
employment each week that he
claimant to prove he has

files

met the

for benefits.

The burden

requirements and

condlt ions

'JP""

ic,

tor

llenet ,.

payments, including of course the requirement that he has made the
work search
Able and

effort.

Available.

require that

a

Rule

A7l-U7-2:1.b(l ),

Although

the Utah

tJ~er',~r

General Rules ot AdJudiccttirJC,

Employment

Security

Act

claimant be engaged in a search for work for any

of hours each day or week to prove he is engaged

in

,,,,l

due-~

~iven n,Jn1l1er

an active good

search, this Court has held that a claimant must be unequivocally

1

oi •,

t'>~u>c--

to the labor market and must show more than a passive willingness to
employment.
supra.

Denby

v. Board of Review,

567 P.

2d 626 (Utah,

1Y77),

L•OClt

Thus, the q11estion of whether or not a claimant has engaged in a J''''':

faith active search for work is a mixed question of law and fact.
With Utah unemployment compensation claims as high as 35,UUU durin'J
particular week, and in recognition of the difficulty involved in the

1

1•ru1''~'

adjudication and payment week by week of benefits, the Legislature yave '-"
the Industrial Commission regulatory powers specifying that claims

111ust

Ire

filed in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Commission,
Rule

A71-07-2:2.c.(7),

General Rules

of Adjudication,

~·

vi des:
Inasmuch as each claimant is advised of his rights and
responsibilities at the beginning of his claim series
and since he certifies to eligibility requirements when
continuing his claims, he should have sufficient knowl edge to put him on notice that certain subjects might be

- 6 -

pr1-

imp<lrtont factors relative to a claim for benefits. The
l;ii111ilnt is then unr1er ohliyation to milke proper inquiry
;in11 L11l1Jre to <in so constitutes fault.
'>i'"rificillly
,,,Jps

conr.ernin~

of Ar1Jur1ication.

~.

a claimant's availability for work, the General
Rule A71-U7-2:1b(I) provides as follows:

lo n1eet this Pligihility re,juirement, the cldimant must
that. he or she is ar,le trJ work, is available
for work, anrl as proof of availability, that he is seekinq wor~ in a manner consistent with the existing con<iitions of the lahor market in his area. He must do
this with respect to each week for which he files a
claim •
« 1,t,ihlish

.Jhen the claimant

filed her npw claim for

henefits

in December 1982,

<he rertifiPr1 that she had receiverl the Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide
,n,1

f,1rthpr certified to the following statement on the claim form:
unr1erstanrl that l must personal l v seek work and be
ahlP and available to accept ful I-time work. l have
rPc«ived the Unemployment Iw,urance Claimant Guide
c>xplaininq my rights and responsibilities. R.OUSZ
!lie 'lnPmp I oyn1ent I nsu ranee Gui de pro vi des:
an active effort to look for work. An active eff0rt means that you should contact several employers in
pPrson each week who would hire people in your occupational field. R.OU53 (Emphasis added)
~ake

The claimant also signed and received a copy of a form entitled "Respon'1i,1l1ties While Claiming Benefits," which provides:
Seek work - l must make an active effort to look for
foll time work each week and will follow up on any job
I earls I am given hy Joh Service. An active effort, in
part., means I will personally contact employers who
1;ould hire people in my occupation. Failure to do so
may he considered as evidence that I do not have a
qen1Jlne r1esire to find immediate employment. R.0081
(Emrhasis ar1rlerl)

- 7 -

This Court affirmed that the Department has the authority to makP inter
pretations of the Employment Security Act in areas of mixed questions ot
and law.

f"

In the case of Salt Lake City Corporation v. Board ot Review ot the

Industrial Commission of Utah and Marian Lynch, 657 P. 2d 1312, (Utah, 1Yd2,
this Court stated:
In administrative law cases, our scope of review of an
agency's decisions as to legal questions and questions
of mixed law and fact is generally broader than our scope
of review of questions of fact. On most questions of
statutory construction, with some exceptions, our review
is plenary with no deference accorded the administrative
determination. That standard is particularly applicable
with respect to constitutional law issues. However,
where the language of a statute indicates a legislative
intention to commit broad discretion to an agency to effectuate the purposes of the legislative scheme, we will
not substitute our judgment for that of the agency as
long as the commission's interpretation has "warrant in
the record" and a "reasonable basis in the law." Unemployment Com}ensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.~3,
153-54 (1946 ; National labor Relations Board v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). Furthermore, where agency decisions deal with technical questions which call for the exercise of expertise, born
either of a technical background and training or long
experience in dealing with numerous, similar problems,
we also accord deference to an agency interpretation
because of the necessity to recognize discretion commensurate with the nature of the issue, as defined by the
general purposes of the Act, although the latitude
accorded may vary with the nature of the issue. SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1946), provides an example. The statutory language required that before the
Commission could give approval to a plan of reorganization of a utility holding company, the Commission was
required to determine among other things that the plan
was "fair and equitable." 332 U.S. at 204. The standard of review under such legal criteria was based on
deference to the "informed discretion" of the Commission and permitted reversal of the Commission's ruling
only upon a plain abuse of its discretion. Id. at 208.
[657 P. 2d, at 1316.]

- 8 -

fhp

111ir11111al rPq1Jirement placed upon claimants to contact several paten-

t1dl '""plovpr\ Pach week in person is reasonable and is supported by case law
For example, in Carr v. Administrator, Unemployoent Compensation Act, ?23 A. 2d 313 (Conn., 1966), the Commission was held
aneri reasrinably in finding that the claimant had not made a reason-

tn hnv0

ahlP effort to look for work when he contacted only one or two places a week.
See ;ilso

,lanes

v.

Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act,

228 A.

2d

,u7 !Conn., 1%61; Redd v. Texas Employment Commission, 431 S.W. 2d 16 (Tx.,

0

19h)'!.

And in Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F. Supp. 9a (Conn., 1973), cited on
!? and

11011es

24 of Plaintiff's

~rief,

the United States District Court for

the llistr1ct of Connecticut stated, contrary to the assertions of the Plaint

if f , as to 1 l ow s:
[I]f a stated number of employers must De visited, a
claimant's acknowledgement that he had seen fewer than
the required number would eliminate the factual controversy and provide an adequate basis for denial of
benefits.
Considering the purpose of the work search requirement and the require-

1i1ent of Denby v. Industrial Commission, _Supra, that a claimant must be unequivirally exposed to the labor market, the instruction to the claimant that she
rontact three employers each week is reasonable and consistent with the gen"rill 1zed v1ork search requirements contained in the Employment Security Act
,rn,1

ir1

the General Rules of Adjudication.

It should be noted in this regard

•«,d thP claimant's testimony that she was instructed to contact employers
e'1thPC in person or by resume was accepted by the Appeal Referee and the Board
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of Review and that even though the Department RPpresentat ive
claimant for

failure to make thrPe in-person

corrected that error.

contacts, the ApfllJdl

''"i ,,
r:Plr,

R.003Y,OOoU

The evidence in this matter is clear.

The claimant wa<, clearly

ted to contact at least three employers each week.
claimant denied

,1is~udl 1 f

receiving the

"Claimant

Guide,"

R.UUoU,UUdl

1 1 1srr1,1-

Althou~n

she acknowledyt'd thctt >'•c

understood she must personally seek work and that she must be able and ava1
able for full-time work.

R.0052-0053

It is interesting to note that al too,

the claimant holds a Masters Degree from a maJor university, and althouyn -•
acknowledged a general

understanding of the requirement to personally

ScP•

work (R.0052-0053), she showed a remarkable lack of interest and concern
the specific requirements and
time she filed her claim.
questions by the Appeal

instructions which were given to her at tnt

This is evidenced by her testimony in resµonsc
Referee

concerning her

understanding

of

search requirement:
Referee:

All right. Now. Then, that same day you signed
Exhibit Number Two, which is your responsibi 1ity statement while claimant benefits. And
again the hit at the work search here. And
your's in particular has heen marked through
and it says three new in-person. Do you recall
that being put on there?

Schoen:

No. I just know that 1 signed it. The whole
idea was to get in and get out because it was
really frustrating. 1 just felt humiliated
that I had to come in here again.

Referee:

We 11

Schoen:

And no, I didn't read it. I' 11 admit to that.
1 didn't read it. I just affixed my signature
to it.

- l0 -

lo

the "ur

1

llP',l"tP v1°rl1rll instructions dCknowledged by the claimant to seek work by
'"'"' 11111 111'rsr,nol contact, and written instructions requiring at least three
,«i! 1 1 ts

t

11r' rl,

;1Pr WPf'k, the record shows that the claimant made only one in-person
Miri

nnP tPI eµhone contact during the week ended January 8, 1983; two

, o-,1Pr-s11n c11ntncts during the week ended January I 5, 1983; and two contacts
c 1 IPtter ,jJr1ny the week ended January 21',

~'

'Jtah, o3",

,,,hu hd,J

contacted
rl

R.U056,0080

This fact

a;1pears s1m1 lar to the situation in the case of Hurd v. Board of

, 1•, 1ilt, l<Jn

11n'''i

IY83.

~.

2d 544 (1Y81 ), wherein this Court held that a claimant

only

three

husinesses

for

the

~urpose

of

finding work

J!J-riay period, was not entitled to unemployment compensation because

his pfforts showed only "a µass1ve sectrch for work" even though he alleged in
01-, rlppecil

to the Roard

of Review that he had n1ade "numerous phone calls

,,,,r,'1rlnt to want ar1 listing;."

''laintiff rel1Ps on

1.2_, 63Cl P. Zd, at 545.

Gocke,~·

as support for her contention that her

'""' s1•nrch was reasonahle and adequate.
'r1e'.

H1·11·1ever, Gocke is ,11stingu1shable

"'1vis1'>i

il'>

See Pages 9 and 10 of Plaintiff's
in

that the claimant therein was not

to the extent of work search she should oe making.

The claimant

"'' '•ocke rel iPr1 on the "Handbook for Claimants" which, when read literally,
"1oPsn't require any aff1rinat1ve action by a claimant other than

_l_ri, at 46.

t1rH1,"
he

registra-

In the present case, however, there can be no doubt that

lcJ1mant was advised as to the extent of work search she should be making

'"' 111 .. re can be no rioubt that she knew, or should have known, what consti,1,,1

c1•1

active effort to secure employment.

- 11 -

The limited contacts made by

the claimant

herein

are

inconsistent

with

an

unequivical

exposure

t,,

'"'

lahor market, and justify the denial of benefits.

POINT III
THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 35-4-4(c), U.C.A. 1~~3, A)
AMENDED, UTILIZED BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMM!oSION FUR UNtMPLUYMENT COMPENSATION ELIGIBILITY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW ANU
JS REASONABLE.
The claimant has misperceived the 2-3 new in-person contact
Contrary to claimant's assertion that the requirement
inflexibly, it

is utilized as a guideline

determining eligibility.

re~uire1nPcl

is applied ri~idly d''-

by Department

Representatives,,

The claimant refers in her brief to an inconsistenc

in the application of the in-person contact requirement stating:
This illustrates the absurdity of this concrete and inflexible minimum contact rule. The rule fails to address
the issue of the diligence and reasonableness of the
claimant's JOb search activities, and is being applied
inconsistently by the Department. Plaintiff's Brief,
at 8.
The claimant further contends that the words of the statute and tne µu•pose of the Act requires a subjective analysis of each individual
acts.

That

is precisely what the Department has done

cla11r1ant'1

in the instant case.

The claimant has offered no proof and cited no evidence that the Oepartrnenl
has applied a 2-3 new in-person contact requirement universally to all cl01P1ants.

Such evidence does

not exist

because it has

not occurred.

In taci.

the rule adopted by the Department and appended to claimant's br1et also due·
not create a concrete and inflexible rule, as alleged by claimant.

iidth••

as stated in the Archivist's announcement, it re-defines "good faith eff"rt"

- 12 -

, ,,,,1

,,,,,,,

1 'I' r., ,,,,,1
, 1,,r\

in1 l111linq,

,1',

'rPotPs

,,

sn instrrictPd

'"" ilr•1Jnrtrnpnt has
npcc, nf hPr work

1,, finr1

ci

,l,1•1P,' that the
•hp \'lf'P'S
nntrl• t

.1

f<Jils to contact a specific number of employers

hy the local

her

office.

circumstances.

claimant's

The claimant

contends that

contacting

The

of

Department,

however,

has

con-

only two employers during each

of

A requirement to

specific nu1nher of employers each week, as a minimal effort, is not

I ,1h11r

1ndrkPt

'.»1rch pfforts

as an inflexible rule,

n claimant's work search efforts.

',,1111" tl1p h+·n1'f1t'

i'1f-lnt

with em-

failure to make an active

in yuestion is less than diligent or reasonable.

f,,r 1'vdl11at1nq

,,

of

contact>

search activities and that she has made a good faith effort

11•1•l 1P1I hy thP Oeputment

t, 111,•

in-pPrson

failed to address the issue of diligence and reasonable-

given

Jnh

I imited to,

r,,h11Udhle presumption

'""'rrli >ihPn d <'i.llrnilrit

1 !pr '•Plnq

r1 1

h11t not

thP IJnernµloyment

llf

hy

r,omhi nat 10n

d

but rather,

as a guideline

The necessity for one who

Insurance Pr0yra111 to exµose herself

of

in-person

contacts and

other work

is ohvi0us, and the Department's requirements of such efforts

osnnilhl2 anrl consistent with the intent and purposes of the Utah Employ\p(1Jr1ty

Act.

POINT IV

THc PP1ICEDllRE llY WHICH THE COMMISSION TERMINATED UNEMPLOYMENT

~ENEFITS TO THE CLAIMANT DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.

r1n1111ant contends

in

her Brief

at

Point

IV that

she was denied

unem-

:"'''It henefits without prior notice and without opportunity for a Goldberg
~

tyµe

of

hearing

this cnntPntion claimant

before

termination

of

benefits.

In

cites the cases of Steinburg v. Fusari,

- l3 -

support

of

supra, and

California Department of Human Resources Development v.
(1971).

Plaintiff explains

the

Fusari

case

as

Java,

holding

4ll2

that

"

<J.).

t~•·

",e11.-

interview" system did not provide sufficient procedurdl duP µruceS'. .• 1,11,tions for unemployment insurance claimants.

A cursory review of the llrotr1c

Court Opinion would lead one to that conclusion.

The lJistrict lourt r" ,-

that the Connecticut procedures for determining unemployment insurance

Pli~,

bility violated due process as follows:
because (a) a property interest has been denied
(b) at an inadequate hearing (c) that is not reviewdble
de novo until an unreasonable length of time. 364 F.
Supp., at 937-938.
The Connecticut legislature thereafter amended the review provisiu 1s
1

its unemployment insurance law.

The U. S. Supreme Court

remanded the .,,,,,

to the District Court to determine whether the new provisions

improve,1 ,,,,

time factor sufficiently to 1nake the entire process legally sufficient, ,rating:
Prompt and adequate administrative review provides an
opportunity for consideration and correction of errors
made in initial eligibility determinations. 9~ ).Ct.,
at 540.
Thus a careful

reading of the opinion of the )upreme Court

in the

~

case clearly shows that the Court was primarily concerned with the lenyth vi
delay in obtaining proper review of a denial of benefits.
subsequently specifically

recognized

by the Supreme Court

This concern
in the

Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), citing Fusari at <JOb.
a disability insurance case,

case

wd'.
1 '

~Q<L

involved the precise issue to which Plaint11

speaks in Point IV of her Brief, that

is,

- 14 -

whether an individual

clai1111n•J

"""Pn! '"'n1•tits

1rn<ler ari Pntitlement program may

',,. ,.,1•hn1Jt." (,olriherg v.
,,11.1l111n•J
1

ir,

1r· t '

\111h

~'"

(,)',PS,

thP

iss11e

1nnsidPrf'r1
rye:,

~type

in

be denied

such bene-

hearing.

pres.•nted,

the

Eldridge

court

set

forth

the

determining the amount of due process re4uired

fo11nwc:,:

:.rr."rr1inqly, resolution of thP issue whether the administrative 1Jrocer111rPs provided here are canst ltutional ly
s1Jfficif'nt requires analysis of the 'Jovernmental and
µrivate interests that are affected. [Citations omitted]
More precisely our µrior decisions indicate that identitication of the specific dictates of due process generally req1Jires consideration of tr,ree distinct factors:
first, the private interest that wi 11 be iffected by the
official actions; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the urocedures used, and
thP µrohahle valJe, if any, of additional or a substitute
proce,1ural safeguarr1, and finally, the government's
intPrPsts, inclurling the function involved and the fiscal
anri administrative hurdens that the additional or substitute procerl1Jral requirement would entail. [Citing
IJol dherg v. ~]
lhe l,u1Jrt then µroceerlerl to

analyze the

individual

interest

lr1ly in Goldberg has the court held that due process
req1Jires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary
·leprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare
nssistance is given to persons on the very margin of
suhsistencP; "the crucial factor in this context a factor not prPsent in the case of . • . virtually
anyone else whose governmental ent it I ements are ended is that termination of aid pending resolution of a
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible
recirient of the very means by which to live while he
waits. 3Y7 U.S., at 264, qo ~.C. at 101~ (Emphasis
in original)."
Eligibility for disability benefits,
in contrast, is not baserl upon financial need. lndPerl, it is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or
'"pport from 1nany other sources, such as earnings of
ell.her ta111ily members, workmen's compensation awards,
1

- l5 -

involved

court claims awards, savings, private insurance, public
or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps,
public assistance, or the "many other important programs both public and private, which contain provisions
for disability payments affecting a substantial portion
of the work force.
" [Footnotes and Citations
omitted. 96 S.Ct., at 905]
After considering the
court conclurled that

an

other

two

factors

evidentiary hearing

previously
is

not

referred

required

me

to.

prior

tu

l~e

termination of disability benefits.
The holding that pre-termination evidentiary hearings are

not

rP•1u1rec

was extended to unemployment insurance cases by Graves v. MeystriK,

42~ f.~.

40 (E.D. Mo.), affirmed 431 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2164, 53 L.Ed. 2d au \Ir
See also Torres v. New York State Department of Labor, 333 F.S. 431

1971), affirmed

405

u.s.

Plaintiff's reliance
opment v.

Java,~.

949,

92

s.Ct.

1185,

31

L.Ed.

2d

(S.D.11.Y.,

no

ii~?:!.

on California Department of Human Resources Uevel-

is likewise misplaced.

The Java case involved

d

pru-

cedure whereby an employer could sit back and await an initial determinat101•
of a claimant's eligibility for unemployment benefits.

If the determinatll"'

found the claimant eligible, the employer could then appeal, thus caus1ny tne
termination of the claimant's benefits pending the outcome of the employer''
appeal.

Such appeals took a median of seven to ten weeks to resolve.

lne

U.S. Supreme Court held in Java that the suspension of unemployment benefits
for such

lengthy

violated due process.
benefits was

period,

after an initial determination of eli9ib1lil;>

In the instant case the termination of the claimant 'c

not initiated by an appeal

- 16 -

of another party,

but

rather

we'

,,,,,,1 "" thf'

'"'lli.

clairnant's

own staternents

in an eliyibility review.

(R.UU79-

The Eli•Jlhility Review is an a<1rninistrat1ve device by which unemploy-

" nt 1n',1Jrancp claimants

are µeri0<11cally asked to prove their eligibility

'"nsi•,tpnt with R11le A71-0l-i':l.b.(I ), General Rules of Adjudication, supra.
'h~

cL1imant was notifierl of the eli~ibility review and was advised as to the

,,1rr1nse of

the

review

and

the

potential

for

disqualification.

She appeared as requested t1y the local

·'.11111<-0IJHO\

office.

(R.007~,

R.UO~~.

U078-

Thereafter the claimant rece1ve<i a notice of denial of benefits which

''"'11

s.he appealP<1

1n

a timely

manner to

ar, Appeal

Referee.

(R.0077,0071)

"''i"ir"rl hy Section 3~-4-lll, U.C.A., 1953, the claimant was given a full

lentiory hearing and a decision was
~ate

As
evi-

issued to her within 49 days from the

she was r1enied benefits (R.0077) and only 46 days from the date of her

appeal to the Referee.

R.0071

This procedure afforded the claimant the full

1ue process of law req1Jired by Eldridge.
r1airnant cites the case of Cal 1fornia Department of Human Resource
~PvPloprnent

v. Java,

riariny pr0cess

~·

violates the

10

Sllpport of her contention that the decision

"payment when due" requirement.

The claimant

f,Jrther cites the lower court decision in Steinburg v. Fusari, supra, and
refer'

t<J

the niHnher of 11ays involved

10

that case between the date of the

nr1q1n.1l rlenial and the 11ate of an appeal heariny.
1Prn 11f the ll.

S.

Supreme Court wlth

.1.11111n1strative appeals,
1
1 .. i r

10

August 197",

as

expressed

respect
in

the

promulgated time-lapse

- l7 -

In response to the con-

to time lapse for
Java

review of

case, the Department

requirements.

of

See 20 C.F.~.

650.

Specifically, 20 C.F.R. 65U.4(b) requires with respect to lowd

.1u1>,,,_

ity appeals, that is appeals before an Appeal Referee or Administrdl 1ve 1 "·
Judge, that 60 percent be decided within 30 days of the ddte of apped I
percent be decided within 75 days from the date ot apµedl.

"",i

Cla1111ctnt 1ct" '"''

offered at any stage of the appeal proceedings any evidence to show thctt ,.,
Department of Employment Security has failed to meet the Federally
time-lapse requirements.

rna11Llnte,1

Indeed, the Department asserts that for many

yenr,

and particularly over the last year, lt has exceeded the Federal tin1P-!a"1 0
requirement for lower authority appeals.
CONCLUSION
There is substantial, competent evidence that the claimant's work

scar._;,

effort during the period for which she was disqualified was less than red,u
able.

The claimant has failed to demonstrate that she was unequiv1cal 11 ex-

posed to the labor market, as required by this Court.

In order to

rnon1l0'

the claimant's work search efforts, she was asked to attend an Eli9ib1l1_,
Review.

The notice sent to the claimant advised her of the µurpo;,e

ot

r1,c

review and further informed her that the information she provided could oe
the basis for a denial of unemployment benefits.

Upon receiving her den1,1

of benefits the claimant had the right, which she exercised, to a fair heMing before an impartial

Appeal

Referee.

Although the time lapse tro111

the

date of the claimant's appeal to the date of her heariny exceeded 3ll ddvs,
there has been no offer of evidence that the Department has failed tc' '""''
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'"

1 ,,,IPral I y
,,,.,

111dnr1dtyr1

,i;J1'~,11s

311 r1oys

witnin

"' i ;i'''' 111 thP r.ppedl
, 1 tnf'

rcqui rPmPnt

of

r1eciding

from

thP

date

60
of

percent
appeal.

of

all

lower

Therefore,

the

,iPfPreP should be dffirmed and the procedure utilized

lleµartment for the

review,

hearing anr1 deciding of cases such as the

ddy uf October, 19d3.
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